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BOOK REVIEW
PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST POLICY. Edited by Almarin Phillips. Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 454. $9.00.
The essays collected in this volume were presented at a seminar at the Uni-
versity of Virginia during the spring term of 1963 which dealt with the many
and varied problems connected with antitrust policy in an economy based upon
competition. The authors, acknowledged experts in business, labor, law, eco-
nomics, and government, offer attitudes and opinions on such topics as: anti-
trust and national goals; administered prices; concentration of market power;
problems of small business, commercial banks, and the transportation industries;
the role of labor unions; exemptions from antitrust laws; and international
competition. Thus, while each of the chapters is a separate essay, their arrange-
ment is intended to provide some continuity of topics. However, the arrange-
ment of topics and the purpose of the symposium was not to develop a particular,
uniform view or thesis regarding competitive policy. On the contrary, it offers
a broad spectrum of opinions and methods of analysis since "the participants were
selected not only for their expertise but also to assure that a range of opinion and
analysis was presented."' In short, the purpose of this collection is to illustrate the
controversial aspects of competitive policy, not to settle the issues in this area.
The contributions in this volume include the following: H. Thomas Austern,
"Problems and Prospects in Antitrust Policy - I"; Morris A. Adelman, "Prob-
lems and Prospects in Antitrust Policy - II"; Ward S. Bowman, Jr., "Problems
and Prospects in Antitrust Policy - III"; Donald Dewey, "Competitive Policy
and National Goals: The Doubtful Relevance of Antitrust"; Richard B.
Heflebower, "Conscious Parallelism and Administered Prices"; Louis B.
Schwartz, "Monopoly, Monopolizing, and Concentration of Market Power: A
Proposal"; Lucile Sheppard Keyes, "The Problem of the 'Good' Trust"; Jesse
W. Markham, "Mergers: The Adequacy of the New Section 7"; Richard H.
Holton, "Antitrust Policy and Small Business"; George W. Mitchell, "Mergers
Among Commercial Banks"; Merton J. Peck, "Competitive Policy for Trans-
portation"; Walter Adams, "Exemptions from Antitrust: Their Extent and
Rationale"; Herbert R. Northrup and Gordon F. Bloom, "Labor Unions and
the Antitrust Laws: Past, Present, and Proposals"; Kingman Brewster, Jr., "The
Influence of International Factors"; Laurence I. Wood, "Antitrust Policy: A
View from Corporate Counsel"; Nat Goldfinger and Theodore J. St. Antoine,
"A View from Labor"; John J. Corson, "The Impact of Antitrust Law on
Corporate Management."
The first three chapters, by Austern, Adelman, and Bowman, comprise a
general introduction and contain at least a summary treatment of most of the
issues raised in the subsequent papers. While the concluding three chapters are
also general, reflecting, however, the particular views of corporate counsel, labor,
and management, the middle chapters present individual policy issues in depth.
Of the first three essays, the one by Austern, a lawyer, was in some respects
the most interesting. The Adelman essay treats three topics - mergers, ad-
1 Text at v.
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ministered prices, and the Common Market with respect to the salient issue of
"economic power," i.e., economies of scale and monopoly power- in his usual
competent fashion. Similarly, Bowman does a respectable job in presenting his
thesis that much of the "monopoly," if not most of it, in this country is beyond
the reach of antitrust laws. By his definition, economic monopoly, as contrasted
with illegal monopoly, includes supply-restricting or price-fixing power and effect
wherever found - in business, government, or labor groups. "Beyond the reach
of antitrust is, thus, a much broader category than exemptions from antitrust."'
The "exemptions," such as resale price maintenance in the distributive trades,
union wages, and "regulated industries," are claimed to be secondary in terms
of monopoly effect to the positive actions of Government, such as tariff and quota
restrictions, crop support programs, oil proration, and foreign trading schemes,
and the numerous state and local occupational licensing laws. The remainder
of his essay briefly touches on the exemption problem involved in resale price
maintenance, in labor, and in a particular regulated industry, transportation.
The Austern piece provides, among other things, a neat review of American
antitrust legislation. Particularly striking is his observation that despite the
presumed roots in the English Common Law and in the struggles with Crown
monopolies, "the concept of 'antitrust' is as American as apple pie."3 Austern
is critical of both the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts for dealing with
symptoms instead of the underlying disease and thus leaving the door open to
misapplication to the little fellow as well as the industrial giants. He also cogently
discusses the shift in emphasis that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under-
went from the 1914 theory that its action would be "prophylactic, preventing
monopoly in its incipiency through the use of cease and desist orders."4 Any
already-established monopoly would presumably be dealt with by the sister
prosecuting agency, the Department of Justice. However, in short time the FTC
also took over enforcement of the Sherman Act. It proceeded against Sherman
Act violations as being "unfair methods of competition" in violation of the FTC
Act. "This is roughly equivalent to saving that a murder is also a breach of the
peace." He also discusses how the Supreme Court decision in the spring of
1963 in the White Motor Company case' shifted or at least retarded the trend
of expanding the per se category of antitrust offenses.
Dewey, in a most refreshing essay, argues the truth of three closely related
propositions, viz: (1) Present federal antitrust policy is largely irrelevant to the
important problems of the American economy; (2) The costs as well as the
benefits of antitrust should be considered as the former may exceed the latter;
(3) Assuming (1) and (2) are true, the case for antitrust must primarily rest
on noneconomic arguments which the professional economist has no special
competence to appraise.
Dewey considers the major problems of American capitalism to be possible
defeat in (1) a military contest, (2) an ideological contest for the support of the
2 Text at 50.
3 Text at 4.
4 Text at 14.
5 Ibid.
6 White Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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politically influential groups, or (3) some sort of output contest with rivals.
Looking at the one most likely to be affected by antitrust policy, problem number
three, he observes that there has been no significant statistical case for or
against monopoly as a source of technological progress. In addition, any con-
tribution antitrust might make toward maintaining full employment is felt to
be small since the most disturbing cost rigidities in our economy are the wage
rigidities over which antitrust agencies have little real power. Although the
elimination of administered prices by antitrust action may be helpful, it is more
than offset by the Robinson-Patman Act which tries to reduce "price discrimina-
tion" or price flexibility. Finally, following the thesis that has been advanced
most frequently by the "Chicago School" that rational business behavior dictates
that you buy out a rival or merge with him rather than engaging in predatory
price-cutting, the antitrust policy takes a new twist. "Antitrust does in fact
greatly limit the use of mergers and cartels and, hence, provides a raison d'etre
for predatory price-cutting."7
The Heflebower essay discusses in a complete and systematic fashion the
various failings or difficulties of the term "administered prices." Since the un-
satisfactory nature of this concept is hinted at in a number of the other essays,
the chapter is certainly appropriate.
After reminding us of the dangers of dogmatism in regard to antitrust
policy - best exemplified by the great industrial machines that have been built
in Germany and Japan on the basis of cartels and concentration of economic
power on the one hand, and the lack of evidence supporting "the bigger, the
better" or efficiency argument for large firms on the other - Schwartz goes on
to suggest legislation that would circumscribe the behavior of unduly powerful
economic entities. His proposal would use both absolute total assets or sales
between one-fourth to one-half billion dollars and relative figures - first or
second in any line of commerce, doing at least 10 percent of the business, etc. -
to determine dominance. His suggestion is most interesting and should be read
in detail by any serious student of antitrust policy.
The Keyes essay is in a sense a continuation of an earlier article that dis-
cussed the "good trust." The "good trust" is a ". . . type of enterprise which
is not characterized by illegal conduct or wrongful intent but which, because
of its possession of market control, may still be in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act."' Although the 1953 Shoe Machinery case9 indicated that the
"good trust" is not necessarily in violation of this section, some other interpreta-
tions of the Act suggest that such enterprises are necessarily in violation of Section
2. This essay examines in detail the central questions involved in the problem of
the "good trust."
Markham's chapter discusses the singular effectiveness that the 1950
amendment to the Clayton Act has had in arresting mergers that unreasonably
7 Text at 80-81.
8 Text at 130.
9 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 '(D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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enhance market power. He goes on to add, however, that more recently
"... Section 7 seems to have been bent to serve the ends normally served by
small business legislation, and the standard of 'injury to competitors' has emerged
as a companion, if not the ranking partner, to the standard of 'substantial injury
to competition'.' The more recent standard no doubt evolved from the vertical
and conglomerate mergers whose competitive effects have been the subject of
so little comment by economists.
Although based on several widely varying industries and subject to some
exceptions, Markham was able to suggest some generalizations that could be
made from the first thirty cases. They involved markets capable of being defined
with reasonable precision, and one or more of the following considerations: (1)
The merger gave the acquiring firm 20 percent or more of the defined market;
(2) The merger strengthened the market position of a firm already among the
largest five, frequently the largest three, in terms of its defined market share;
(3) Mergers in this industry in the recent past substantially lessened competition
and, in most cases, successive mergers by the defendant had contributed to this
trend.
Holton's essay briefly discusses the pros and cons of small business protec-
tion arguments before examinating in detail the distributive trade, which has
been involved in so many of the antitrust cases involving small business. In
particular, the "case of gasoline distribution is used as a vehicle for exploring
the economic interrelationships in distribution which lead to antitrust problems.""
A very brief statistical verification of the gradually shrinking role of small busi-
ness in the American economy is used as his take-off point in this inquiry. His
comments on firm versus market demand elasticities and price wars - especially
on the evidence against the collusion thesis - are most enlightening.
Chapters 10 and 11 focus on industries - banking and transportation -
which until recently were rarely discussed in an antitrust context. Therefore,
both authors, Mitchell in banking and Peck in transportation, devote some
space to describing the salient characteristics of these industries. Banking and
transportation were outside the scope of antitrust policy in the past because
it was believed that the kind of real world solution the market would generate
in these industries would be both undesirable and unworkable. The authors
accordingly stress the advantages of a competitive or market solution to the prob-
lems of these industries as distinct from the workings of antitrust policy. They
also imply, in possible contrast to Dewey's chapter, that antitrust is necessary
for competition to work in these industries.
Mitchell suggests that banks and bankers are very like firms and managers
and argues that policies which stress such concepts as an "overbanked" economy
are "badly out of step with the times."' 2 In particular, he argues that bank
mergers are primarily a function of profit-seeking and discounts many of the
popular reasons (management problems, desire to offer a complete range of
10 Text at 187.
11 Text at 191.
12 Text at 226.
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banking services, social prestige and political power associated with bigness, etc.)
that have been used to explain bank mergers. Stressing the advantages of com-
petition, he concludes that prospective bank mergers ought not to be appraised
in the light of "public interest" but as they contribute to a reduction or potential
reduction in competition.
Peck makes a somewhat more detailed analysis of the advantages and dis-
advantages of competitive policy in transportation and, although he comes out
strongly for competition as opposed to regulation, he warns us not to expect
too much as "the adjustments will be via relatively small changes at the margins
of the various sectors of transportation."'" Peck's analysis is sound and is also a
good, brief introduction to the problems of the transportation industry (airlines
excluded).
The next two chapters (Adams, and Northrup and Bloom) discuss the
exemptions from the antitrust laws. Adams analyzes in broad perspective the
exemptions from antitrust by regulation and "administrative preemption." He
finds, as do most observers of regulation, that regulatory policy falls far short
of any desired ideal and vigorously proclaims its ineptness. He calls for de-
regulation where possible and, where regulation is necessary, he would still re-
quire the regulatory agencies "to promote competition to the maximum extent
possible."' 4
Exemption by administrative preemption arises primarily in defense, space,
and atomic energy where, Adams argues, the administrative decisions of certain
agencies foster the kind of structure, behavior, and performance that the anti-
trust laws are designed to prevent. His examples are well taken - profit pyramid-
ing, private ownership of patents derived from research and development
financed by the government, the creation of monopolies or near monopolies
by contract-letting practices - although some, e.g., profit pyramiding, have
already been corrected. The criticisms by Adams are well taken but it is not
clear that other criteria such as quality, timing, and technical know-how might
not outweigh the antitrust objective. In short, the goals of all government
agencies may not necessarily coincide with the goals of antitrust agencies.'
Northrup and Bloom present a brief history and analysis of labor unions
and the antitrust laws. They come out in favor of the present practice of
union exemption from antitrust but are still very definitely in favor of curtail-
ment of labor union "power." They propose that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
be repealed or substantially revised and that Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3)
of the Taft-Hartley Act that require employers and unions to bargain in good
faith also be repealed. However, in the face of declining union membership
and the difficulties that beset the unions as they try to organize labor in the
South, one wonders whether Bloom and Northrup may not have ascribed too
much power to unions.
13 Text at 267.
14 Text at 299.
15 This chapter also includes a useful appendix - Statutory Exemptions from the Opera-
tion of the Federal "Antitrust (or Antimonopoly)" and Certain Trade Regulation Laws.
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Kingman Brewster discusses a somewhat neglected aspect of antitrust policy
- "the legal complications and implications of antitrust policy in foreign com-
merce."' 6 The legal limitations of our international antitrust policy are briefly
defined and their somewhat chauvinistic character described. Brewster argues
that the "per se," "rule of reason," and "market power" concepts are interpreted
somewhat differently in the international context but it is difficult, given the
brevity of his paper, to fully appreciate the differences of interpretation.
The last three chapters are perhaps the most openly partisan since they
are not only written by people who are employees of organizations which have a
stake in the way the antitrust laws are practiced and enforced but, judging from
the titles of these chapters, are designed to present a particular point of view.
Wood's chapter is perhaps the most novel of the three as he focuses on the
fact that it is individuals who commit the acts that the antitrust-enforcing
agencies prosecute and that it is necessary to protect the civil rights of individuals,
both singly and in the aggregate. He points out the vagueness of the various
antitrust laws and the dilemma that salesmen and managers face in interpreting
this vagueness, and concludes with a request for careful analysis and discussion
on the part of both government and business. Mr. Wood offers no explicit
solutions to any of the problems he raises and one gets the feeling that in this
gray area there are few broad rules which have general applicability.
Goldfinger and St. Antoine present the arguments left out by Northrup
and Bloom concerning the inapplicability of the antitrust laws to labor unions.
They imply that there is general agreement among "serious knowledgeable
thinkers" that the antitrust laws ought not to apply to labor unions. We doubt,
however, whether the concensus is as great as Goldfinger and St. Antoine would
have us believe. Indeed, they do such a good job developing the thesis that
unions have but very little power that in the end they are obliged to change
direction and argue that unions are not without significant economic effect.
The final chapter by Corson amplifies some of the points made earlier by
Wood and, by reference to several different cases, manages to convey the impact
that the atmosphere of uncertainty generated by the antitrust laws has on cor-
porate management. One might differ with Mr. Corson over his views of the
dilemma which confront zealous IBM salesmen in the light of the consent decree
requiring IBM "to limit its sales of tabulating cards to not more than one-half
of the total of such sales."'" In the end, however, we both agree with and
applaud his conclusion - "The problem I have tried to depict will not be met
by any amendment of the antitrust laws or modification of enforcement prac-
tices. It is essentially a management problem."'"
This book has achieved its goal of discussing a number of controversial
issues in the area of antitrust policy. The individual pieces are cross-referenced,
which permits comparison of the different views although one would also have
liked to read comments by the members of the seminar on the papers of their
16 Text at 355.
17 Text at 432.
18 Text at 443.
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colleagues. A table of cases index, in addition to the more typical index, is
also a useful innovation. The main shortcoming of the book is perhaps the appeal
of the several authors to casual empiricism, single observation, or straight asser-
tion to substantiate very debatable points about the real world. All in all, this




* Assistant Professors, Department of Economics, Washington University (St. Louis).
